How should a government use the power to commit to ensure a desirable equilibrium outcome? In this paper, I show a misleading aspect of what has become a standard approach to this question, and I propose an alternative. I show that the complete description of an optimal (indeed, of any) policy scheme requires outlining the consequences of paths that are often neglected. The specification of policy along those paths is crucial in determining which schemes implement a unique equilibrium and which ones leave room for multiple equilibria that depend on the expectations of the private sector.
Introduction
The central role of macroeconomic policy is to lead the economy to a "good" equilibrium outcome. 1 As examples, fiscal policy should aim at reducing the deadweight loss from distortionary taxes within the limits of the instruments available to raise public resources or to achieve redistribution. Monetary policy is commonly associated with the desire to achieve low and stable inflation, and sometimes with the goal of output stabilization. 2 The design of economic policy becomes more complex in a dynamic environment, in which the actions of the economic players are not all taken once and for all and at the same time, but rather the opportunity of making choices unfolds over time. Kydland and Prescott [21] first recognized this; when the government is acting under discretion at each point in time, the problem of finding an optimal policy is very different from the same problem when the government has the power to commit to precise rules of conduct beforehand. Since then, the literature has followed two paths.
The first path has abandoned the traditional approach of viewing government policy as an optimal control problem, and has developed tools for analyzing government policy under discretion. A general framework for this is contained in Chari and Kehoe [10] and Stokey [33] . A common * Very preliminary. I am indebted to Florin Bidian, V.V. Chari, Russell Cooper, Jeff Ely, Larry Jones, Chris Phelan and especially Narayana Kocherlakota for useful conversations and advice.
1 What "good" means depends on the details of the model that forms the basis for evaluating the impact of government policy as well as on the preferences of the policymaker. 2 For recent surveys, see e.g. Chari and Kehoe [11] and Clarida, Galí and Gertler [13] .
result of this literature is the emergence of multiple equilibria due to what Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum [7] called "expectations traps", i.e., the possibility that the formation of adverse expectations by the private sector may force the government to validate ex post the expectations and choose a policy that is undesirable ex ante but is the least evil ex post. A second, larger group of papers has continued to study the design of optimal policy without considering time consistency. Some of these papers explicitly assume that the government has the ability to commit to its policy in advance; 3 many others look for the best policy or even simply analyze the consequences of different policies leaving aside the issue of what assumptions on government preferences and/or commitment powers are necessary to adopt them. Although the potential for multiple equilibria is not as widespread in these models, it nonetheless appears on many occasions. In monetary economics, interest rate rules are often a source of indeterminacy, 4 but so can be money supply rules. 5 Cooper [16] and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [30] present examples in which fiscal policy may be the cause of or the solution to complementarities that lead to multiple equilibria. While Chari and Kehoe [10] and Stokey [33] are mainly interested in environments where there is no commitment, they also contain a very clear characterization of a standard way commitment is modeled, and their treatment is a useful benchmark that I will use for comparison.
As in the latter group of papers, I study government policy assuming commitment is possible. Using Kydland and Prescott's terminology, I study a government that can rely on prespecified rules. However, I show that even with commitment a full specification of strategies, rather than merely policies, is necessary to judge which government choices lead to multiple equilibria and which do not.
In section 2, I introduce my remarks by comparing commitment in a military example from Schelling [29] and a tax example due to Fischer [17] . In section 3, I introduce a general framework for addressing the question at hand and review the definitions of Ramsey outcome and Ramsey equilibrium. I show what conditions lead to a unique equilibrium outcome according to these definitions; I then propose an alternative definition of an equilibrium, which I argue is better suited to capture the meaning of commitment in most macroeconomic applications. The tax example from section 2 is used throughout to compare the implications of the different assumptions. Section 4 discusses other instances in which the analysis presented here is relevant, and section 5 concludes.
Examples of Commitment in Games with Many Players
While my primary focus is on macroeconomic policy games, it is useful to start from a military example, in which the issues that I will raise are particularly clear.
I consider the general of an army that is facing an enemy on an island. The island is connected to a friendly mainland by some bridges. The general is confident that his army will win a battle, provided all of his troops will obey his orders and attack as planned. However, he is concerned about the possibility of defections. Specifically, he knows that his army would lose if some soldiers started abandoning the island through the bridges. Everyone knows that his forces would not be able to win the battle in this case, and it would then be preferable for each soldier individually to retreat to the mainland rather than to be part of the remaining army that faces defeat. The general is thus caught in a situation in which there are two equilibria: if every soldier expects everybody else to participate in the battle, defecting would not pay compared to being part of the winning army, so that everybody will participate in the battle and victory will ensue. However, if the soldiers expect a significant number of defectors, they will opt for a retreat, validating their expectations: the island will then be left to the enemy.
How could the general ensure that no defections will happen? Schelling [29] suggests a solution: if the general can burn the bridges that connect the island to mainland, retreat will be impossible, and each soldier will be forced to fight or perish. In this case, the "good equilibrium" will be ensured.
In most macroeconomic policy games, however, commitment of this form is not readily available. Rather, it is assumed that the policymaker can design an institutional framework that allows to commit in advance to actions that will be carried out in the future. The choice of an independent central banker with hawkish preferences towards inflation is one such example.
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Using again Schelling's terminology, this means that the government can achieve conditional commitment through binding promises: the commitment is conditional because the government can promise in advance to alter its future course of actions depending on the environment and the actions taken by other players in the game.
Going back to the military example, let us suppose that the general cannot burn bridges, but can send a messenger back to the mainland that will announce his future (possibly contingent) actions to the king. Once the policy is announced, the king will execute the general if the announced policy is not carried out, so that the general will carry out any announced policy as long as possible. Suppose the general sends a messenger to the king with the following announcement: "I will personally shoot with my own rifle any soldier that retreats." Is this commitment enough to get rid of the bad equilibrium? Unfortunately for the general, this is unlikely to be the case. If every soldier believes that he will certainly be shot in the case of a retreat, the threat would be successful. However, if a soldier expects a large number of defectors, he will not only realize that the army is facing defeat, but also that the general will not be physically able to carry out the threat of killing every defector with his own rifle: in this case, the best choice will still be to flee and hope not to be one of the few that the general may shoot. There will thus still be two equilibria after the announcement: in the first, the army will win and nobody will defect; in the second, everybody will defect, and the general will be executed.
The conclusion I just reached is the opposite of what is usually concluded in macroeconomic policy games with commitment. In such games, it is customary not to question whether the government (in our example, the general's) threat is physically possible under all contingencies.
Any threat is taken to be credible even when it is physically impossible under some contingencies. In the case of our general, each soldier believes he will be shot with certainty independently of the number of defectors, and thus a unique (good) equilibrium is achieved. I now illustrate this using an example from Fischer [17] and Chari and Kehoe [10] .
The economy lasts for two periods, 1 and 2. 7 In the first period, a continuum of households is endowed with ω units of a good that can be either consumed or invested. Each unit invested in period 1 delivers R > 1 units in period 2. In addition, households can produce the consumption good in period 2 using labor, with 1 unit of time spent working producing 1 unit of the good. Household preferences are U (c 1 , c 2 , l), where c 1 ≥ 0 is consumption in period 1, c 2 ≥ 0 is consumption in period 2 and l ≥ 0 is the labor supply. I assume that U is strictly concave and such that the optimal labor supply is uniformly bounded for all possible combinations of taxes below. The government must finance an exogenously given level of spending G * in per capita terms in the second period. To raise resources, it can use a proportional tax on capital income (δ) or a proportional tax on labor income (τ ). The budget constraints for an individual household are thus:
It is assumed that G * > 0 but that it is not too large, so that there are equilibria (defined below) in which G * can be financed. For the commitment case, Chari and Kehoe assume that the government moves first and chooses a policy π ≡ (δ, τ ). 8 Given this policy, each individual household maximizes its utility subject to (1) .
The equilibrium of the economy with commitment is called Ramsey equilibrium, and involves a government policy π r and an allocation rule
(i) for each policy π , f (π ) maximizes the individual's utility subject to (1).
(ii) given f , π r is a policy that maximizes
Generically, this game gives rise to a unique equilibrium. In an equilibrium of this game, the household maximization problem gives a unique solution for each policy π , so that f is uniquely determined; the assumption that G * is not too large implies that there are policies such that the budget constraint (2) holds; by varying the policy, the government can thus attain any competitive equilibrium and it will choose the best.
9
To get uniqueness of an equilibrium, it is essential that households believe that the tax rates will be δ r and τ r independently of the actions any other player might take in the economy. In our military example, this corresponds to the soldier's belief that he will be shot by the general if he flees, independently of how many other defectors there are among his comrades. But, is this policy really feasible? As a soldier that ponders his best move in the case many of his comrades will defect, each household must ponder its best move when many households choose some other action. As an example, let us consider a household that ponders what its course of action should be if all other households choose l(π r ) but k = 0. As a first step, the household may think that the government will set its policy to π r , so that its choices should not be affected. However, as the soldier realizes that the general would not be able to shoot everyone if all the soldiers flee, so the household realizes that π r is a physically impossible choice for the government under this scenario: per capita revenues would be τ r l r , and would thus fall short of
By assumption, all of these possibilities are ruled out. Uniqueness of an equilibrium relies thus on the assumption that households believe that the government will take π r even when this is patently impossible under some scenarios. This problem is not lost to Chari and Kehoe. 10 Their assumption is that the government will receive a large penalty −M whenever the economy attains an outcome in which G * > δRK + τ L, where K is aggregate capital and L is aggregate labor. In other words, their solution relies on assuming that it is possible for the government, albeit very costly, to pay for spending from resources that come from outside the model. 11 In this case, an unconditional commitment to π r is indeed feasible. This approach to commitment is implicit throughout much of the macroeconomic literature.
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In what follows, I will propose an alternative definition of commitment, that allows the government to tie its hands but not in a way that would ever violate any of its physical constraints.
A General Setup
In this section, I introduce a general setup to formally analyze the implications of commitment. In §3.1, I introduce the notation and review the standard definition of an equilibrium outcome 9 The theorem of the maximum ensures that a solution to the government maximization problem exists; multiple equilibria may arise when the solution is not unique, but all equilibria will then share the same welfare.
10 See section V.A in their paper. 11 In private conversation, Chari explained to me that Chari and Kehoe [10] implicitly assumed that government spending would have to adjust, rather than being financed from resources outside of the model, and that government spending is assumed to be weakly separable from consumption and the labor supply. The implications of these assumptions are studied below.
12 Even many papers that do not assume commitment face a similar problem. It is almost universally assumed that the tax rate on labor is set unconditionally before the labor supply is observed, even when no commitment is allowed along many other possible dimensions. This implicit commitment not to revise the tax on labor is open to exactly the same criticism, as the reader can verify e.g. by looking at Chari and Kehoe's "no-commitment game". 
Ramsey outcome and Ramsey equilibrium
I follow here the notation in Stokey [33] . The players of the economy are a continuum of identical private households and a government.
Households choose an action x from a set X, and the government chooses an action y from a set Y . Given that the focus is on symmetric equilibria, the economy is only described along paths in which all households, except at most a measure 0 set, take the same action. The economy is subject to an aggregate feasibility constraint that requires (x, y) ∈ D ⊆ X × Y . I will refer to a feasible (x, y) pair as an outcome. In the tax example of the previous section, a household action is a choice (l,
2 , and an outcome is a vector (l, k, δ, τ ) such that the government financing constraint holds:
Household preferences are described by a function u : X × D → R, 13 where the first argument is the individual household choice and the second is the pair of aggregate choices by all households and the government. For the example, after substituting (1),
In the example, households are not directly affected by the aggregate choices of capital and labor K and L. Government preferences are described by a function w : D → R. It is often assumed, though not necessary for our analysis, that the government is "benevolent", i.e., that
This is the case for the tax example.
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A competitive equilibrium is a pair (x, y) with the following properties:
13 In Stokey [33] , individual households are subject to a constraint in their choices, which is represented by a correspondence H : D → X. This constraint is inconsistent with representing the economy as a game, which I find essential for establishing proper results on implementation. The constraint H would require the choice set of a household to depend on information (the moves of other households) that is not yet available at the moment in which the decision is taken. H is meant to capture individual budget constraints. I will consider applications in which X can be chosen so that H(x, y) = X ∀(x, y) ∈ D, i.e., the households can choose any action x ∈ X independently of what the government does or other households do. In the example, this is achieved by assuming that the household choice is about k and l, so that c 1 and c 2 are determined by (1) . Whenever prices are an important part of the economy, I assume they are explicitly formed through a well-specified market mechanism by the actions of the households and the government, as in Bassetto [1] .
14 The only advantage of (5) is that it provides unambiguous results on the welfare properties of different equilibria. When (5) does not hold, the welfare implications become harder to interpret. 
As expected, a competitive equilibrium is not a strategic notion of an equilibrium; rather, it only involves an outcome at which each household is taking a best response to what the government and other households are doing. Let E be the set of competitive equilibria. In the tax example, a competitive equilibrium is any outcome in which (k, l) maximize (4) given (δ, τ ) and the government budget constraint (3) holds.
The most commonly used notion of equilibrium outcome under commitment in macroeconomics is what Stokey calls a Ramsey outcome. It is a competitive equilibrium (x r , y r ) such that (x r , y r ) = arg max
The Ramsey outcome is the best possible outcome among competitive equilibria. The restriction to a competitive equilibrium follows from the assumption that the government does not have access to a way of enforcing directly the actions of each individual household; rather, it can only affect the households' behavior through the choice of y. In order to attain this outcome, it is often necessary that the government move first. If this is not the case, the households would have to choose x based on the anticipation of what the government will do, rather than on its actual choice; in this case, the government would no longer perceive (x, y) ∈ E as a constraint, but would rather take as given the households' choices. This is the basic time-consistency problem.
In the example, it is easy to prove that a Ramsey outcome coincides with the equilibrium of Chari and Kehoe's commitment game.
Even when the government moves first, the ability of attaining the Ramsey outcome should not be taken for granted. This observation is present in Chari and Kehoe. In their commitment game, which I will henceforth call Ramsey game to distinguish from the alternative that I will propose below, a government strategy is simply a choice of y, and a household strategy is a mapping σ h : Y → X. This game is described in figure 3.1. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a pair (y, σ h ) such that:
In words, a subgame perfect equilibrium is such that the private households will respond to any government choice by moving to a competitive equilibrium, and such that the government will choose its most favorable action given the mapping from its actions to competitive equilibria that is implied by the household choices.
In order to define a Ramsey game (and its equilibrium), Chari and Kehoe need to overcome an important difficulty. When the government moves first, the feasibility restriction (x, y) ∈ D cannot be imposed, since: (i) by choosing an action y first, the government cannot make sure that the households will choose an action x such that (x, y) ∈ D.
(ii) the restriction to D is a restriction on aggregate quantities and not on individual households. In the game, each household is free to choose any action x ∈ X.
Chari and Kehoe extend the set of possible (symmetric) outcomes to X × Y , but set w(x, y) to a very large penalty when (x, y) ∈ D so that the government will act in such a way to ensure an outcome in D whenever possible. This is the key difference between their game, which represents the view of commitment generally adopted in macroeconomics, and the one I will advocate. In that game, violating a feasibility constraint is "less impossible" than violating the terms of commitment; the general of the previous section is able to shoot all the rank and file of his army by himself, although at a very large utility cost.
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I now turn to the implications of this game for the ability of the government to attain the best possible competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1 (implementability)
Consider any game between the government and the households. Let (x, y) be a competitive equilibrium. (x, y) is said to be implementable if there exists a government strategy σ g such that:
(i) given any household strategy σ h , the outcome of the strategy profile (σ g , σ h ) is either (x, y) or is not a competitive equilibrium;
(ii) there is at least one household strategy σ h such that the outcome of (σ g , σ h ) is (x, y).
Similarly, given a set of competitive equilibria S ⊆ E, we say that S is implementable if there exists a government strategy σ g such that:
(i) given any household strategy σ h , the outcome of the strategy profile (σ g , σ h ) is either an element of S or is not a competitive equilibrium;
(ii) there is at least one household strategy σ h such that the outcome of (σ g , σ h ) is in S.
Any strategy σ g for which the properties mentioned above hold is said to implement the outcome (or the set).
A competitive equilibrium (x, y) is thus implementable if the government can behave in a way that makes (x, y) the inevitable equilibrium outcome. To see this, suppose that the government adopts the strategy σ g . Each individual household has to ponder how to react if other households choose strategies that potentially lead to anyx. By definition of implementability, each household would have an incentive to deviate from what other households do unlessx = x. As a consequence, if the government is known to be playing according to σ g , the only consistent expectation for a household is to expect that everybody will make choices that lead to (x, y), to which playing x is a best response.
The definition of implementability does not address the issue of whether the government will choose a strategy that implements (x, y): it is silent on the incentives of the government.
By choosing a strategy, the government acts as a mechanism designer: each strategy designs a game that the households will play. The government is a very constrained designer: the class of games that a choice of σ g generates is very restricted compared to the extreme latitude that is usually available in the implementation literature.
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Within the Ramsey game, the following results describe the relationship between implementability and Ramsey outcomes.
Proposition 1 Let (x, y) ∈ E. Then (x, y) is implementable if and only if
Proof. See appendix. In this game, it is enough for the government to be able to choose an action y r that is part of one or more Ramsey outcomes and of no other competitive equilibrium. The action does not need to be feasible for all choices of x; the government can incur the risk of receiving an arbitrarily large penalty if households choose x such that (x, y r ) ∈ D, because this will never happen on the equilibrium path.
To study implementability in the tax example, it is important to take a stand on whether the set of competitive equilibria E should or should not be expanded when feasibility D is dropped. So far, we only specified that the government will receive a large penalty −M for pairs (x, y) ∈ D. Whether this penalty only affects the government or is imposed on each individual household is irrelevant: equation (3) involves aggregate capital and labor, so that each individual household would not be able to trigger the penalty or to avoid it. What is important is the description of the consequences of individual actions in contingencies in which the government "creates" extra resources to cover its shortfall in revenues. I assume here that preferences are still described by (4), whether (3) holds or not: this implies that the set of competitive equilibria is expanded.
Under this assumption, the Ramsey outcome is implementable in the Ramsey game simply by choosing the appropriate policy (τ r , δ r ).
Proposition 2 Assume that
Assume further that a Ramsey outcome exists. Proof. See appendix. The intuition of the proposition is straightforward. An equilibrium of the game requires the outcome to be a competitive equilibrium, for otherwise each individual household would have an incentive to deviate. The government thus knows that, whatever action y it chooses, the equilibrium household response will form a competitive equilibrium with the action y. When the set of Ramsey outcomes is implementable, the government can choose an action y r that guarantees the Ramsey pay-off w * , which is the best the government can attain given the household response. As a consequence, the government will have an incentive to choose y r , to which the household will respond with an action x r such that (x r , y r ) that delivers utility w * to the government. For the tax example, we already observed that the Ramsey outcome is implementable in the Ramsey game and thus it is the unique equilibrium outcome of the Ramsey game.
Committing to Strategies
As Schelling [29] , I view commitment as a process of threats and promises that the government is able to bind itself to; after such threats and promises are made, a game that is otherwise identical to the no-commitment game ensues. I thus start by describing the no-commitment game, which is schematized in figure 3 .2. In the absence of commitment, households move first and choose x ∈ X. While the actions of each individual household are unobservable, the aggregate distribution of actions µ is observed.
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Let M be the space of such distributions.
After the households have moved, the government picks an action y ∈ Y such that (µ, y) ∈ D. Although I still label the set of feasible outcomes as D, it now belongs to a more general space, as it describes what is feasible even when the distribution of actions taken by the households is nondegenerate. We need to assume that D is such that ∀µ ∈ M, ∃y : (µ, y) ∈ D. In words, the government must always have at least one feasible action no matter what the households played. This action may depend of course on the specific distribution µ.
As I extend D to account for distributions, so I need to extend the household and government preferences. The household preferences are thus described by a function u : X × M × Y → R and the government preferences are defined as w : M × Y → R. The first argument of u is the action taken by the individual household, the second (and first of w) is the distribution of actions taken by other households and the last one (of both u and w) is the action taken by the government. I assume that u is strictly concave in the first argument and that X is convex, which ensures that, in any equilibrium, all households will take the same choice.
As before, a competitive equilibrium is a pair (x, y) such that:
where δ x attributes measure 1 to the action x;
The set of competitive equilibria of this game coincides with the set of competitive equilibria of the Ramsey game.
A strategy for the households is now simply a choice of x; a strategy for the government is a function σ g : M → Y such that (µ, σ g (µ)) ∈ D ∀µ ∈ M . I thus define a sequential equilibrium to be a pair (x, σ g ) such that:
A no-commitment outcome is any outcome of a sequential equilibrium. While the characterization of the game here is more complete, it is straightforward to prove that the pairs (x, y) that form a no-commitment outcome coincide with the no-commitment outcomes according to the definition in Stokey [33] and to what Chari and Kehoe [10] call equilibrium outcomes of the no-commitment game. The interpretation is also the same: in a no-commitment outcome, the government moves second and optimizes taking as given what the households did; the households correctly anticipate what other households and the government will do.
Proposition 3 A competitive equilibrium (x, y) is implementable in the game without commitment if and only if
Proof. See appendix. In words, a competitive equilibrium is implementable if the government can respond to any choicex by the households with some action y that is feasible when all households choosex but that is not a competitive equilibrium withx.
Proposition 4
In order for (x, y) to be implementable in the game without commitment, it is neither necessary nor sufficient that (x, y) be implementable in the Ramsey game.
Proof. Let (x, y) be implementable in the game without commitment. It may still be possible to find (x, y) ∈ E withx = x, which implies that (x, y) is not implementable in the Ramsey game. By having to choose y first, the government cannot respond tox using some other actionŷ that does not form a competitive equilibrium withx; when no commitment is assumed, the strategy σ g that implements (x, y) may instead prescribe such a response. Let (x, y) be implementable in the game with commitment. It may be possible to findx such that (x, y) ∈ E but (x,ŷ) ∈ E ∀ŷ : (δx,ŷ) ∈ D. In this case, y is not a feasible government action after the households chosex; the Ramsey game lets the government choose such an action ex ante, but the game without commitment does not. Furthermore, any government response tox would validatex as part of an equilibrium, so that there is nothing the government can do to persuade households not to playx if they believe all other households will playx. QED. Proposition 4 shows that there is no role for talking about the "benefits of commitment" in evaluating a Ramsey game vs. a no-commitment game. The government must trade off the advantage of committing with the loss in flexibility due to the fact that actions are chosen first. The two games correspond to two different environments that cannot be compared.
In many economic examples, the government cannot really take its action first; rather, commitment is best described as the ability to tie its hands with respect to actions that will be taken later. The essential difference is captured by Schelling:
The threat differs from the ordinary commitment, however, in that it makes one's course of action conditional on what the other player does. While the commitment fixes one's course of action, the threat fixes a course of reaction, of response to the other player. The commitment is a means of gaining first move in a game in which first move carries an advantage; the threat is a commitment to a strategy for second move. 20 I adopt a more natural definition of commitment, which preserves the feasibility restrictions that are part of the basic economic environment, follows Schelling's idea that (contingent) commitment is made of binding threats and promises and justifies the intuition that commitment is advantageous for the government. Commitment corresponds to an initial stage of the game prior to the no-commitment game being played; I depict this new game in figure 3.2 and will refer to this game as the game with binding promises, to distinguish it from the Ramsey game. As in the examples of section 2, the government can make a binding announcement of the actions it will take later, conditional on what the households will do.
The game unfolds thus as follows:
(i) First, the government moves. Its action is the choice of a strategy σ g it will adhere to in the ensuing game. This action corresponds to a promise by the government to undertake some action in the future, which is taken to be binding.
(ii) After having observed the government choice of a strategy, the households choose x ∈ X.
(iii) After having observed the distribution of actions of the private sector µ, the government adopts σ g (µ). Under the assumption of commitment, the government has no choice at this stage.
This game differs from Chari and Kehoe [10] in two main respects: (ii) even though the government can bind itself in advance to the response it will take after any choice by the households, the response must be feasible for the government ex post, i.e., it must be an action of the game that ensues. As a consequence, it is not necessary to expand the game by assigning arbitrary payoffs to outcomes that do not correspond to any feasible pair (x, y).
The definition of a competitive equilibrium for the game with binding promises is identical to the one for the no-commitment game. In a competitive equilibrium, the pairs of actions (x, y) is held fixed and only individual optimality for the households is considered; whether the government chooses y as a result of commitment or freely at the last stage of the game is thus irrelevant. More importantly, the presence of commitment does not alter what the government can do, although of course it greatly affects what the government will choose to do. This is made formal by the formal proposition.
Proposition 5 (x, y) is implementable in the no-commitment game if and only if it is implementable in the game with binding promises.
Proof. A government strategy in the game with binding promises is made of a single action, which is the choice of a strategy of the no-commitment game. 21 If σ g is a strategy of the nocommitment game that implements (x, y), then the strategy of committing to σ g implements (x, y) in the game with binding promises; vice versa, if a strategy that involves a commitment to σ g implements (x, y) in the game with binding promises, then σ g also implements (x, y) in the no-commitment game. QED.
The difference between implementability in the Ramsey game and the game with binding promises is very important for policy advice. According to the former game, if the set of Ramsey outcomes is implementable, then the government simply needs to set its policy to the preferred outcome; e.g., it only needs to specify a tax rate (or a sequence of tax rates) and a level of spending, or the level of the money supply. Policy advice becomes thus relatively simple. In the latter game, implementability simply means that it is possible to design a strategy such that any competitive equilibrium of the game that ensues will be a Ramsey outcome; the role of the policy advisor is thus to design such a strategy, or "reaction function", that will typically involve different actions in response to different choices by the households. It is necessary to contemplate all possible choices by the households, and to recommend a policy that is consistent with the Ramsey outcome but that makes it optimal for individual households to deviate from what other households do whenever what they do is not a Ramsey outcome.
A weakness of the game with binding promises is that it often does not admit a subgameperfect equilibrium. To see this, assume that, for each action x by the households, the government can choose a response σ g (x) such that (x, σ g (x)) is not a competitive equilibrium. If the government commits to such a strategy, there is no equilibrium in the subgame that ensues. This is a problem that is shared by the literature on mechanism design: whenever games that have no equilibrium can be chosen by the designer, it is not possible to model the stage at which the mechanism is designed as part of the game itself.
Without making further assumptions, when Ramsey outcomes are implementable, it is still possible to conclude the following:
(i) the government can commit to a strategy such that all equilibrium outcomes following the commitment are Ramsey;
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(ii) no other strategy can imply a higher utility in any equilibrium that follows such strategy.
It is thus natural to think that the government would choose a strategy that implements Ramsey outcomes whenever such a strategy is available.
An alternative approach is to restrict the strategies that the government can adopt. A fairly natural restriction requires the government to commit to strategies that are weakly continuous in µ. Intuitively, a discontinuous strategy is very difficult to choose in practice: the government would have to radically change its course of actions in response to small changes in the households' distribution of actions, which may be hard if this distribution is not really perfectly observed. Proposition 10 in the appendix shows that this restriction is often sufficient to ensure existence of an equilibrium.
If we restrict the government to choose strategies that are compatible with a competitive equilibrium, either as I suggested above or in any other way, the following proposition highlights the relationship between implementability of Ramsey outcomes and the ability of the government to attain them in an equilibrium.
Proposition 6
Assume the government is restricted to commit to strategies σ g ∈ Σ, such that the game has a subgame-perfect equilibrium. If the set of Ramsey outcomes is implementable by a strategy in Σ, then the outcome of any subgame-perfect equilibrium will be a Ramsey outcome.
Proof. Identical to the proof of proposition 2, part (ii).
Equilibria with Binding Promises in the Tax Example
In this subsection, I revisit the tax example within a game with binding promises. To do this, it is necessary to add some missing elements of the game. Let K and L be aggregate capital and labor (formally defined below). As the game was described in the previous sections, the government would have no feasible actions when the household choices lead to RK + L < G * : even if it levied 100% taxes on both capital and labor income, seizing the entire output of the economy, the government would be short of its exogenous spending requirement. To avoid this difficulty, public spending must be made endogenous, although it is possible to specify preferences such that it is arbitrarily costly to adjust it to a level different from G * . The level of spending G is thus now an explicit action of the government.
Given a distribution µ over individual saving and labor supply decisions, the government budget constraint requires the government policy (δ, τ, G) to satisfy the following constraint:
where K and L are the average saving and labor supply according to the distribution µ. Next, we need to specify preferences for the government and the households. I will look at the implications of two specifications:
where I assume U to be bounded and M to be an arbitrarily large number; I G =G * is the indicator function of the event G = G * . It is important to notice that the presence of the penalty M does not play an important role here. Indeed, such a discontinuity in G seems quite arbitrary, and I choose it only to retain Fischer's [17] and Chari and Kehoe's [10] assumption that the equilibrium will involve G * whenever this is possible; a more natural specification of preferences would not affect the insights on implementability and the existence of equilibria that I present below.
I assume that the government maximizes average utility, i.e.,
These preferences coincide with those of the representative household in a symmetric equilibrium in which all households take the same action. Equation (10) implies that government spending is separable from consumption and labor, so that the optimal choice of (k, l) by each individual household is unaffected by the level of G. These preferences will yield results that are essentially equivalent to the Ramsey game.
Equation (11) implies instead that government spending increases the marginal utility of consumption for each household; as an example, G could be roads that allow the consumers to transport the goods being produced at home, where consumption takes place. With fewer roads, the good can be transported less effectively.
It is important to notice that (10) and (11) coincide with (4) when G = G * : they both have the same implications in the Ramsey game. Given this observation and the fact that in a Ramsey outcome G = G * , 23 the Ramsey outcome is also the same as in Chari and Kehoe under both sets of preferences.
I first consider the implications of (10).
Proposition 7 When preferences are described by (10), the Ramsey outcome is implementable. One (continuous) strategy that implements it is to set uncontingent tax rates and let spending be determined as a residual.
Proof and comment. This proposition is a direct counterpart to the result in the Ramsey game. When preferences are given by (10), the choice of (k, l) is driven by (δ, τ ) alone and is independent of G. As a consequence, if the government commits to tax rates δ r and τ r and sets G = δ r RK + τ r L for any K and L that results from the choices of households, a unique competitive equilibrium ensues, which is the Ramsey outcome. QED.
Corollary 1 If preferences are given by (10), the Ramsey outcome is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with binding promises if the government is restricted to play continuous strategies.
Proof. See appendix. For the preferences (10), there is no difference in outcome between the Ramsey game and the game with binding promises. However, the government strategy is very different in the two environments. The strategy in the game with binding promises makes it explicit that, if needed, the government is committed to rein in its spending in order not to be forced to raise its tax rates ex post. By making the adjustment explicit, the game with binding promises makes it easier to judge the validity of commitment in any given application: depending on the environment, the assumption that it is possible to commit not to stray from the announced (possibly contingent) tax rates and to let G adjust accordingly may be deemed appropriate, or it may be considered invalid, in which case the outcomes of the game without commitment will have to be considered. A similar judgment call is impossible in the Ramsey game: the only natural conclusion there is to reject the assumption that the government can commit to spend resources it may not have. (11) , the Ramsey outcome is not implementable.
Proposition 8 When preferences are given by

Proof.
No matter what the government does, there is an equilibrium in which all households choose k = l = 0. If the aggregate capital and labor supply are 0, the government budget constraint implies that G = 0 independently of the tax rates. When households expect G = 0, it is (weakly) optimal to choose k = l = 0. As a consequence, no matter what the government strategy is, there always exists an equilibrium in which k = l = G = 0. QED.
In this case, the game with binding promises reaches a dramatically different conclusion from the Ramsey game. In the latter game, households believe that G = G * , even when there are no resources for this to happen; in the former, households realize that the government may be forced to G = 0 and it is impossible to rule out an equilibrium with no production in the second period. It is worth emphasizing that this does not imply that the economy will necessarily be stuck in such an equilibrium. As an example, there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game restricted to continuous strategies in which the government plays the strategy of setting unconditional taxes τ r and δ r and households choose the Ramsey quantities (k r , l r ). What fails is the ability of government policy to select among equilibria and steer the economy to the preferred outcome.
Multiperiod Games
I presented in detail a one-period game for simplicity. However, extending the analysis to multiperiod games is straightforward.
For the Ramsey game, there is no difference between a one-period and a multiperiod version: x and y can either represent one-shot actions, or sequences of actions by the government and the households. In a Ramsey game, the government takes all of its actions first, so its move is one shot independently of the number of periods of the original game.
In a no-commitment game, the evolution of time must be accounted for explicitly, as the actions that are feasible to each household and to the government may depend on the history of previous actions in the game. As I did previously, I now define the game with binding promises as one in which the government can commit to a strategy that it will use in playing what is otherwise identical to the no-commitment game. Because this is a strategy, all the feasibility restrictions on government policy that are present in the no-commitment game (whether repeated or dynamic) are maintained in the game with binding promises. None of these constraints can instead be included in the Ramsey game, in which an unconditional sequence of actions is chosen.
Some Applications
Increasing Returns
The potential for multiple equilibria arises often in models with technological complementarities such as Benhabib and Farmer [3] and Baxter and King [2] .
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I consider here an example which I adapt from Cooper [16] . 25 In this economy, households choose an effort level e ∈ [e,ē]. Each household has access to a production technology that requires effort and is also affected by the average effort E exerted by other households. The amount produced by a household that chooses effort e is given by
where β > γ > 0. The household preferences over consumption and effort are given by c − ke θ , where c is the consumption level, k > 0, and θ > β + γ. the government of this economy can set up a tax administration, which requires a fixed cost τ to run. If the administration is set up, the government can levy a lump-sum tax T ∈ R + that can be used to provide a proportional subsidy to production at a rate s ∈ R + .
The government budget constraint is
where Y is aggregate output of the economy. The first constraint stems from the assumption that taxes are collected before the subsidy is paid out. Each individual household consumes thus
If the government does not set up the tax administration, this economy has a unique equilibrium:
Depending on the value of τ , the Ramsey outcome either coincides with (15) or is given by
I assume that (16) 
Solving (17) and imposing the equilibrium condition e = E, it can be verified that the Ramsey outcome is the unique equilibrium in the subgame that follows the government commitment. This game is an unsatisfactory representation of the situation for two reasons:
(i) If all households choose a low effort (E is sufficiently low), each individual household might not able to meet its tax obligations T * , even if it chose e =ē. In this case, the implied consumption would be negative. What should we conclude about the optimal level of effort for a household that believes it will not be able to pay taxes no matter what work effort it chooses? What impact would this have on the actual government revenues in (13)? (ii) If all households choose a higher effort than e * , the government budget constraint (13) fails to hold: the government would not have enough resources to pay its subsidy. However, by assumption households must believe that taxes are still going to be T * and the subsidy is still going to be s * , for it is under this assumption that the higher level of effort was ruled out as an equilibrium.
As in the previous section, the Ramsey game is not an appropriate representation of the strategic interaction between households and the government in this instance. I now describe this interaction in a more consistent way.
I assume that government taxes must be collected before the subsidy is paid out. The lumpsum nature of the tax is translated into the assumption that the government can seize any output the household has up to the amount T , and "put the household in jail" if the output is less than T . The jail penalty is −P < min{−ē θ , −T }, and is thus sufficiently harsh that any household will want to avoid it if at all possible. In order to operate this technology, it is necessary that tax revenues cover at least the fixed cost τ of running the tax administration.
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Government revenues from each household are now min{T, e β E γ }, which implies that the government budget constraint is
or T = 0 and s = 0. In the no-commitment version of this game, a strategy for the government is now a map from the set of distributions M into pairs of taxes and subsidies (T, s) ∈ R + subject to (13) and (18) . As before, in the game with binding promises, an action of the government is the choice of a strategy to which the government commits prior to playing a game that coincides with the no-commitment game.
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Now suppose thatŷ < τ. 29 In this case, if households do not expect the government to provide any subsidies, they will all choose effortê, leading to a production levelŷ. If production isŷ, there are not enough resources for the government to set up a tax administration: even with commitment, the government will be unable to intervene, validating the expectations that led households to chooseê. This reasoning proves the following: Proposition 9 Ifŷ < τ,the Ramsey outcome is not implementable in the game with binding promises.
Once feasibility restrictions are taken into account, the subsidization scheme cannot ensure that the economy will attain the Ramsey outcome. The best the government can do is to commit to a strategy that admits the Ramsey outcome as one of the equilibria in the subgame played by the households; the option to subsidize output offers the government the chance to improve upon the laissez-faire equilibrium, but not the definite ability to coordinate the economy to a welfare-improving equilibrium.
Fiscal Theory of the Price Level
The fiscal theory of the price level 30 is based on the assumption that the government can commit to a sequence of real taxes and spending {(T t , G t )} ∞ t=0 that can violate the present-value budget constraint for some price levels.
Compared to the examples in the previous sections, the fiscal theory of the price level is much more complex. This is partly of course because the environment is much richer, but mainly because the definition of a competitive equilibrium includes a sequence of prices that are not a choice of any player in the economy.
In order to define a competitive equilibrium, it is not necessary to explain the process that leads to a price p out of the actions of the households (x) and of the government (y). Within a competitive equilibrium, both x and y are held fixed; there is no difficulty in adding a third element to the definition, the price system p, that is also taken as given.
On the contrary, when the goal is to find the solution to an implementation problem, I have shown in the previous sections that it becomes crucial to establish which actions each of the players in the economy can take in all contingencies. This is impossible without a full description of the game, that must include an explicit account of the way prices form out of the actions of the government and the households. In the case of the fiscal theory of the price level, I analyze such a game in detail in Bassetto [1] . In that paper, I do not overturn the conclusion that fiscal policy can be used to select among the many equilibria consistent with an interest-rate peg. However, I show that the policy rule the fiscal theory is based on involves actions that are impossible in some contingencies and is thus not a strategy of the game. A correct strategy that implements a given equilibrium is significantly different from an unconditional commitment to a sequence 29 It is worth pointing out that there is an open set of parameter values that satisfies all of the implicit restrictions that I have assumed. As an example, there is a neighborhood of β = 0.9, γ = 0.6, θ = 1.6, k = 0.8, τ = 0.5 for which all restrictions hold.
30 See Sims [32] , Woodford [36] , Cochrane [15] .
, and this difference has important implications for policy advice and for evaluating the likelihood that government commitment can be sustained.
Monetary Policy Rules
In recent years, there has been significant research on the welfare and equilibrium determinacy properties of monetary policy rules. 31 The goal of this research is to find how monetary policy can be used to implement desirable equilibrium outcomes.
Svensson [34] and Svensson and Woodford [35] distinguish between a policy rule and a reaction function. A policy rule is a "prescribed guide for monetary-policy conduct." It usually takes the form of a simple relationship that may involve government policy, exogenous variables and endogenous variables, both past, present and future (in expectation). A reaction function "specifies the central bank's instrument as a function of predetermined endogenous or exogenous variables observable to the central bank at the time that it sets the instrument." The solution to any implementation problem should thus include a reaction function and not simply a policy rule. A policy rule may only be useful as a simple tool to evaluate whether the government is adhering to its commitment. For this purpose, it might have the advantage of being much simpler and hence more transparent than the reaction function itself.
A reaction function corresponds to what I called in this paper a government strategy, so the analysis I developed here supports the view that implementation should be studied at the level of government reaction functions. Svensson and Woodford [35] are mainly focused on interest-rate rules, in which the instrument used by the central bank is the nominal interest rate. The only restriction they identify is that this instrument should be a function of predetermined variables only, a necessary requirement for a strategy in a game. A fuller description of the economy as a game is likely to entail further restrictions. As an example, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [31] study the implications of Taylor rules in which interest rates are allowed to be negative in some contingencies. Whether the nonnegativity constraint on nominal interest rates should be viewed as an equilibrium condition or a restriction on government policy can only be ascertained within a fully developed game, in which a government strategy can be more precisely defined.
Conclusion
In many macroeconomic problems, the policy actions available to the government depend on previous choices made by the private sector. In this paper, I have shown that modeling government commitment as the ability to take (or set) its actions before any other player moves is unsatisfactory from the perspective of designing optimal policy schemes. When the potential for multiple equilibria is present, this approach may also paint a misleading picture of the ability of the government to determine the equilibrium outcome that will prevail. I have presented an alternative description of the strategic interaction between the government and private agents, one in which the ability of the government to commit corresponds to the ability to set a strategy that it will adhere to.
In the examples I have presented, the restrictions on government policy came from clear and unavoidable physical constraints, such as the impossibility of spending resources that do not exist. These examples were chosen to show that my rejection of games with commitment to actions does not merely arise from a "lack of credibility" of the commitment. In practice, modeling commitment as a game with binding promises may also be a fruitful way of including explicitly further restrictions on government policy that do not arise from physical impossibility, but from a limited ability to commit.
households playσ h (y * ) and the government plays y * , i.e., (σ h (y * ), y * ) must be a competitive equilibrium. By the properties of y * , w(σ h (y * ), y * ) = w * . But then choosingŷ is not optimal for the government: a contradiction. QED.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose condition (8) holds. Then I can find a government strategy σ g such that:
(i) σ g (x) = y;
(ii) ∀x ∈ X,x = x =⇒ (σ g (x), x) ∈ E This strategy implements the competitive equilibrium (x, y). Suppose instead that (x, y) is implementable. Let σ g a government strategy that implements it. It follows that ∀x ∈ X,x = x =⇒ (σ g (x),x) ∈ D\E QED.
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
This corollary would follow immediately from propositions 7 and 10, except for the fact that the example does not satisfy the compactness assumption on X and the continuity of u with respect to G. Those assumptions are used to prove that the household best response is well-defined and upper hemi-continuous in the actions played by other households (when they all play the same action). This result applies to the example as well:
(i) G does not affect the best response of the households, so the discontinuity in that term has no effect;
(ii) by assumption, the optimal labor supply is uniformly bounded, so there is no loss in restricting X to a compact set.
QED.
A. Proof. First, we prove that, for any continuous government strategy σ g , it is possible to find a household action x (dependent on σ g ) such that (x, σ g (δ x )) is a competitive equilibrium. To prove this, for any given strategy σ g we construct the following correspondence:
Given our assumptions, b is nonempty and upper hemi-continuous in x. By Kakutani's fixedpoint theorem, there existsx ∈ X :x ∈ b(x), which proves the first claim. Now, let (x r , y r ) be a Ramsey outcome. Consider a government strategyσ g such that σ g (δ x r ) = y r . Letσ h be a household strategy in the game with binding promises such that:
Such a strategy exists by our first claim. It follows immediately that (σ h ,σ g ) is a subgameperfect equilibrium of the game. QED.
